The area of computation called artificial intelligence (AI) is falsified by describing a previous 1972 falsification of AI by British applied mathematician James Lighthill. It is explained howL ighthill's arguments continue to apply to current AI. It is argued that AI should use the Popperian scientific method in which it is the duty of every scientist to attempt to falsify theories and if theories are falsified to replace or modify them. The paper describes the Popperian method in detail and discusses Paul Nurse'sapplication of the method to cell biology that also involves questions of mechanism and behavior.A rguments used by Lighthill in his original 1972 report that falsifed AI are discussed. The Lighthill arguments are then shown to apply to current AI. The argument uses recent scholarship to explain Lighthill'sa ssumptions and to showh ow the arguments based on those assumptions continue to falsify modern AI. An iimportant focus of the argument involves Hilbert'sp hilosophical programme that defined knowledge and truth as provable formal sentences. Current AI takes the Hilbert programme as dogma beyond criticism while Lighthill as a mid 20th century applied mathematician had abandoned it. The paper uses recent scholarship to explain John von Neumann'scriticism of AI that I claim was assumed by Lighthill. The paper discusses computer chess programs to showL ighthill'sc ombinatorial explosion still applies to AI but not humans. An argument showing that Turing Machines (TM) are not the correct description of computation is given. The paper concludes by advocating studying computation as Peter Naur'sDataology.
Introduction
This paper applies the method of falsification discovered by Karl Popper to showt hat artificial intelligence (AI) programs are not intelligent and in fact are just normal computer programs in which programmers express their ideas by writing computer code. AI is meaningless metaphysics in the Popperian sense of metaphysics based on a number of incorrect assumptions and dogmas that was falsified by James Lighthill in his evaluation of AI for the British science funding agency ( Lighthill[1972] ). This paper defends Lighthill's2 0th century falsification of AI and explains howitapplies to current AI. This paper presents material the author developed from being encouraged to criticize AI as a1960s Stanford University undergraduate and from a talk giventoPaul Feyerabend'sphilosophy of science seminar while the author was a computer science (CS) student at UC Berkeley. In order to understand whyLighthill'scriticism falsifies AI and whyhis arguments still apply to AI nowi nt he second decade of the 21st century in spite of vast improvements in computer speed and capacity,i ti sn ecessary to understand the development of modern computers primarily by physicists after WWII. The paper uses recent historical scholarship to explain Lighthill's background assumptions and shows howthat background knowledge also falsifies current AI.
What is Popperian falsification
Falsification is a method discovered by Karl Popper that argues general statements do not have scientific merit. Only singular statements Popper calls basic statements that have simple structure have meaning. Such statements can be disprovene ither by scientific experiments or by logic , p. 74). Popper'smajor contribution to the philosophyofscience is to insist that it is the duty of every scientist to criticizes one'sown theories to the fullest extent possible so that false theories can be modified or replaced. Popperians believe scientific method consists of numerous bold conjectures that are then tested and if falsified, eliminated or modified. Popper's method calls for bold conjecture followed by stringent criticism.
Popper'so riginal falsification theory developed in the late 1920s and early 1930s is called naive falsification (Lakatos[1999], pp. 64-85 (Lakatos[1970] ). There were disagreements among the Popperians about questions of emphasis butn ot about methodology or importance of rationality in science. James Lighthill, as holder of the Lucasian chair in applied mathematics at Cambridge University,was familiar with and part of the milieu that developed Popperian theory.
Falsification as a theory in the philosophyo fs cience is usually discussed in terms of physics because the developers were trained as physicists. Physics is possibly not a good fit for study of AI methodology because there is no mechanism or functional explanation involved in attempting to understand physical reality (describe fields or particle interactions for example). The connection to cell biology that attempts to understand and utilize the mechanisms of cell behavior is closer.P aul Nurse in his 2016 Popper Memorial Lecture discusses the importance of bold conjectures and diligent attempts to eliminate incorrect theory by falsification (Nurse[2016] ). Nurse also discussed data analysis in cell biology.F or readers unfamiliar with Popperian falsification, the Nurse lecture provides an excellent introduction.
Falsification of AI is important because it is claimed that computational intelligence is now so successful that discussions of ethical issues involving howi nferior humans will deal with the superior intellect of AI robots are required. The author believest he primary obligation of scientists is to eliminate false theories.
Lighthill'sfalsification of AI
Lighthill'sf alsification of AI is quite simple (Lighthill[1972] ) and I claim continues to apply to AI in spite of changes mostly in vastly faster computers that execute machine instructions in parallel and newnames for algorithms such as "deep learning" that replaces alpha beta heuristics to improve logic resolution algorithms to implement intelligence. Lighthill argues AI is just CS described using the language of human intelligence and views computers and computation as tools for expressing people'sideas.
Lighthill divides AI into three areas. Category A: Automation (feedback control engineering), Category C: computer based studies of the central nervous system, and Category B: the bridge area between A and B this is supposedly going to provide the magic synergy that allow creation of intelligent robots (p. 3). Fore xample, current deep learning would fall into areas A and B. It falls into category B because it involves automatic logical deduction without anyn eed for a person to program ideas into the algorithm, but also it is in category A because it "looks beyond conventional data processing to the problems involved in large-scale data banking and retrieval." (p. 5) I think Lighthill is arguing here that AI studies normal computer science but rephrases problems in terms of human attributes (p. 7 paragraph 2).
According to Lighthill for control engineering it should not matter howt he engineering is accomplished. Lighthill writes in the section discussing category A: "Nevertheless it (AI) must be looked at as a natural extension of previous work of automation of human activities, and be judged by essentially the same criteria." (p. 4 paragraph 4). After more than 40 years of computer development, programmable digital computers are usually the best choice for control engineering. In modern terms current feedback control engineering is based on improvements in camera technology allowing more precise location measurements and more complexf eedback. Advances and cost reductions in computer and storage technology allowlarge amounts of data to be processed faster and at lower cost.
In criticizing AI'sa pproach to area C since obviously it makes sense to study neurophysiology,Lighthill distinguishes syntactic automation as advocated currently by AI versus conceptual automation (p. 6). He asks if "a device that mimics some human function somehow assists in studying and making a theory of the function of the central nervous system." (p. 6 paragraph 4)
Lighthill criticizes the use of mathematical logic in AI by arguing practical use runs into a combinatorial explosion (p. 10 paragraph 5) and argues there are difficulties in storing axioms favored by logicians versus heuristic knowledge favored by AI (p. 10, paragraph 6). In my view this is the crucial falsifier of AI. Namely,a lthough Lighthill was attempting to provide a neutral assessment of AI, he did not believe inthe Hilbert Programme that is the central tenet of AI.
Lighthill also discusses organization problems with AI methodology.H eq uestions claims such as "robots better than humans by 2000" (p. 13) (nowprobably replace with 2030). Lighthill as an applied mathematician also discusses the combinatorial explosion that humans solvebut can not be solved by formal algorithms.
Understanding Lighthill'sfalsification in modernterms
In 1972 Lighthill falsified AI by showing its individual claims were false and by arguing there was no unified subject but rather just normal problems in the are of computation involving computer applications and study of data. AI researchers were not convinced at the time, I think, because Lighthill did not makehis Popperian viewofscience clear.T he remainder of this paper discusses how1 970s scientific background knowledge especially in the physics and applied mathematics areas falsifies current AI methods. The discussion is possible because of recent scholarship especially in the areas of Hilbert'sphilosophical programme and in the study of John vonNeumann'sthinking during the development of digital computers.
Skepticism toward Hilbert'sprogramme of truth as formal proof
In the 1920s, mathematician David Hilbert conjectured that knowledge and truth consists solely of all sentences that can be provenf rom axioms. Hilbert'so riginal conjecture was a mathematical problem. However, itw as interpreted as a philosophical theory in which truth became formal proof from axioms. Ap aradigmatic example is the Birkhoffa nd Von Neumann formalization of quantum mechanics as axiomatized logic (Birkhoff[1936] , Popper] 1968] attempted to falsify it). Hilbert'sp rogramme as the basic assumption of AI is that knowledge about the world can be expresses as formal sentences. Knowledge is then expressed as formulas that can be derivedu sing logic (usually predicate calculus) from other sentences about the world that are true.
In addition to the belief that knowledge is formal sentences, the foundation of AI is the belief that the Church'-Turing Thesis (Copeland[2015] ) is true. Namely,t hat nothing can exist outside of formally provens entences. provenf rom axioms. In the AI community this dogma is beyond criticism. However, the philosophical Hilbert programme was abandoned starting in the 1930s for various reasons. The reason most often giveni st hat Goedel'si ncompleteness results showed the Hilbert programme could not succeed. The Hilbert programme is still believedinthe logic area and AI seems to be grasping at the strawofattempts to mitigate the Goedel disproof by finding in practice areas where Goedel'sresults do not apply.Z ach [2015] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophyarticle discusses some attempts to mitigate Goedel'sresults. See Detlefsen[2017] ) for a more skeptical viewofHilbert'sprogramme.
There were a number of other reasons Hilbert'sp hilosophical programme was rejected. These other reasons explain whyt he AI argument that since people have intelligence computer programs can also have intelligence. In the viewo fA I, the problem is just building faster computers and developing better algorithms so that computers can discovera nd learn the formal sentences in people'sh eads. In fact the other reasons the Hilbert programme was abandoned showwhy Lighthill'sfalsification is correct and whyAIismeaningless metaphysics.
Von Neumann'sargument automata and neural networks useless at high levels of complexity
During the second half of the 20th century,J ohn von Neumann'sw ork on computers and computations was widely accepted. Publication of Von Neumann'sw ork on computing did not occur until years after Lighthill'sf alsification was written (in particular , Neumann [2005] and Kohler[2001] ). HoweverL ighthill as an applied mathematician was certainly familiar with Von Neumann'swork.
John Von Neumann studied automata and neural networks when he was developing his Von Neumann computer architecture. Vo nN eumann combined all his skepticism toward linguistics and automata as sources of AI algorithms in discussing problems with formal neural networks when he wrote: (Von Neumann[1966] , quoted in , note 94, p. 321).
The insight that a formal neuron network can do anything whichyou can describe in words a very important insight and simplifies mattersenormously at low complication levels. It is by no means certain that it is a simplification on high complication levels. It is perfectly possible that on high complication levels the value of the theorem is in the reverse direction, namely,t hat you can express logics in terms of these efforts and the converse may not be true
Vo nNeumann also considered and rejected current AI methodology when he developed the Vo nNeumann computer architecture. In a 1946 paper with Herman Goldstine on the design of a digital computer Von Neumann believedthat some sort of intuition had to be built into programs instead of using brute force searching , p. 62). Edward Kohler (Kohler[2000] ), p. 118) describes von Neumann'sd iscovery in developing modern computer architecture in an article "Whyvon Neumann Rejected Carnap'sDuality of Information Concepts" as:
Most readersa re tempted to regardt he claim as trivial that automata can simulate arbitrarily complexb ehavior,a ssuming it is described exactly enough. But in fact, describing behavior exactly in the first place constitutes genuine scientific creativity.I ti sj ust suchap rima facie superficial task whichv on Neumann achieved in his [1945] famous explication of the "von Neumann machine" regarded as the standardarc hitecturefor most post World-War-II computers.
The problem context in the area of operations research solution space searching that influenced both von Neumann and Lighthill was pre computer algorithmic operations research experience (see Budiansky[2013] for the detailed story). Understanding the limitations of combinatorial explosion arises naturally from that experience.
Skepticism toward linguistics and formal languages in computing
Starting with Ludwig Wittgenstein in the late 1930s, skepticism toward linguistics and especially formal languages become prevalent. Wittgenstein'sc laim was that mathematical (and other) language was nothing more than pointing (Wittgenstein[1930] ). The Popperians and English science in general were receptive toW ittgenstein and his "pointing" philosophyo f mathematics. Popperians avoid linguistic philosophyb ecause theyv iewed it as creating more problems than it solved. I read Lighthill'sfalsification as assuming this attitude toward language. Modern AI still claims knowledge and truth is limited to provable formal sentences.
Physicist skepticism towards mathematics as axiomatized logic
In my viewt here was a more important reason for the rejection of Hilbert'sp rogramme. Physicists were always skeptical toward axiomatized mathematics. Albert Einstein in his 1921 lecture on geometry expresses this skepticism. Einstein believedt hat formal mathematics was incomplete and disconnected from physical reality.E instein stated:
This viewo fa xioms, advocated by modern axiomatics, purgesm athematics of all extraneous elements. ... suchanexpurgated exposition of mathematics makes it also evident that mathematics as suchcannot predicate anything about objects of our intuition or real objects (Einstein[1921]).
Niels Bohr argued that first comes the conceptual theory then the calculation.
Finsler'srejection of axiomatics and general 1926 inconsistency result
In addition to skepticism toward axiomatics, there was also skepticism toward set theory and its core claim that only sentences that are derivable from axioms (Zermelo Fraenkel probably) can exist. Swiss mathematician Paul Finsler believedthat mathematics exists outside of language (formal sentences). Finsler claimed to have shown incompleteness in formal systems before Goedel in 1925 and that his proof was superior because it was not tied to Russell'sl ogic as Goedel'sw as. See "A Restoration the failed: Paul Finsler'st heory of sets" in Breger[1996] , p. 257 for discussion of Finsler'sr esult on undecidability and formal proofs and its history (also Finsler[1996] and Finsler [1969] .
Chess -elite human players response to chess programs
Superiority of chess programs overe vent he best human chess players is cited as evidence that in the future AI robots will be superior in all areas involving intelligence. In fact the situation is more complicated. The response by the world'sb est chess players shows that Lighthill's claims that eveni naf ormal sentenced based toyw orld, combinatorial explosion limits problem solving ability of algorithms. Study of chess playing programs and evaluation of their efficacy showthe problems with recent claims of AI successes in general.
In 1997, the Deep Blue chess program defeated then world champion Gary Kasperov. Since then the world'sb est chess players have adjusted to computer chess programs. In the December 31 Financial Times newspaper chess column, Leonard Barton referring to US champion Fabiano Caruana writes:
The US champion and world No. 2 unleashed a brilliant opening novelty,w hichi ncidentally showed the limitations of the most powerful computers (Barton[2016] ).
It has taken twodecades and Caruana was only fiveyears old when Kasperovlost to Deep Blue, buti ta ppears computer algorithms will run into the combinatorial explosion problems and more and more of the best players will defeat computers.
Possibly more interesting is howthe claims showproblems with AI scientific methodology and emphasize the lack of diligent attempts to falsify AI theory.F irst, the financial incentive structure of the challenge meant that Kasperovm ade more moneyb yl osing rather than by winning. From Kasperov'sv iewpoint he could win and go back to collecting meager chess tournament prize moneyorlose and collect a large appearance fee plus receiving numerous other appearance fees as a marketing representative.M anyA Ic laims of success involving human competition with computers followt his pattern. At a minimum, AI tests of this type need to use double blind protocols. Abetter method for determining if computers can defeat the best human players would be to use double blind tournaments where opponents may be humans or computers and participants and officials were not allowed to knoww ho was who. Even better would be a system where chess player'sn atural competitiveness was utilized so that losing to a lower rated human player would result in a large deduction of rating points.
Finally,p rogress in chess playing computer programs shows that chess programs are normal data processing applications in the Lighthill sense in which human knowledge of chess can be expressed and amplified by injecting it into a computer by writing a computer program.
Turing Machine incorrect model for computation
The central argument for AI is based on the Church Turing thesis. Namely that Turing machines (TM) are universal and anything that involves intelligence can be calculated by TMs. Applying Lighthill'sc ombinatorial explosion arguments, it seems to me that TMs are the wrong model of computation. Instead a different computational model called MRAMS (random access machines with unit multiply and a bounded number of unbounded size memory cells) is a better model of computation ). Von Neumann understood the need for random access memory in his design of the von Neumann architecture (ibid. pp. 5-6). ForM RAM machines deterministic and non deterministic computations are both solvable in polynomial bound time so at least for some problems in the class NP,t he combinatorial explosion is mitigated. This suggests that algorithms should be studied as normal data processing because AI'sa ssumption that heuristics and guessing will somehowimprove algorithms is problematic.
Conclusion -suggestion to replace AI with Naur'sDataology
Ap roblem with this paper is that people trained to perform advanced computational research before the 1970s primarily by physicists can'ti magine AI as having anyc ontent, but people trained after CS became formalized as object oriented programming, computer programs verified by correctness proofs and axiomatized proofs of algorithm efficiencyc an'ti magine anything but computation as formalized logic. Computation researchers trained after the 1970s are unable to imagine alternativest ot he AI dogmas. My suggestion is to adopt the ideas of Danish computer scientist, who was trained as an astronomer,P eter Naur.N aur argued that computation should be studied as Dataology.D ataology is a theory neutral term for studying data. Naur wrote "mental life during the twentieth century has become entirely misguided into an ideological position such that only discussions that adopt the computer inspired form" are accepted. (Naur[2007] , 87).
In the 1990s, Peter Naur,o ne of the founders of computer science, realized that CS had become too much formal mathematics separated from reality.N aur advocated the importance of programmer specific program development that does not use preconceptions. Iw ould put it as computation allows people to express their ideas by writing computer programs.
The clearest explanation for Naur'sm ethod appears in the book Conversations -Pluralism in SoftwareE ngineering (Naur[2011] ). This books amplifies the program development method Naur described in his 2005 Turing Award lecture (Naur[2007] ). In Naur[2011] page 30, the interviewer asks "... you basically say that there are no foundations, there is no such thing as computer science, and we must not formalize for the sakeofformalization alone." Naur answers, "I am not sure I see it this way.Isee these techniques as tools which are applicable in some cases, but which definitely are not basic in anysense." Naur continues (p. 44) "The programmer has to realize what these alternativesare and then choose the one that suits his understanding best. This has nothing to do with formal proofs." Dataology without preconceptions and predictions of imminent replacement of human intelligence by robots would improve the scientific study of computation. The next step for advocates of AI would be to try to falsify Naur'sDataology.
